We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level principles in a general choicetheoretic model.
Introduction
Many policy problems require the choice of social alternatives where the composition and the size of the population may vary from one possible state of affairs to another. For example, policy choices involving the allocation of funds The paper was presented at the Paris Ethics seminar, the University of Maynooth, the Université de Montréal, the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and the 1999 Conference on Axiomatic Resource Allocation Theory in Namur. We thank a referee, Marc Fleurbaey, Jean-François Laslier, Philippe Mongin, Hans Peters, and James Redekop for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial support through a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence to: W. Bossert to population-control programs, prenatal care, or the intertemporal and intergenerational allocation of resources cannot be analyzed satisfactorily in a fixedpopulation framework. A specific resource-allocation problem is analyzed in Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1999c), where a foreign-aid budget can be allocated to consumption aid and population-control aid.
Welfarist approaches to population ethics usually proceed by identifying social orderings with attractive properties that are capable of comparing states of affairs involving different populations and population sizes.
1 Once a social ordering is established, social choices can be made by selecting the best states among those that are feasible, provided that best elements exist. An application of this methodology can be found, for example, in the above-mentioned paper on population-ethical aspects of foreign-aid programmes: a specific social ordering is used to solve allocation problems by selecting the best consumption-populationcontrol combinations according to this ordering, given a fixed aid budget that describes the set of feasible allocations.
Because variable-population considerations (as well as many other economicpolicy issues) typically arise in choice problems, it may be more appropriate to analyze choices directly rather than to assume the existence of a rationalizing ordering from the outset. Thomson (1996a), for instance, makes this point in his discussion of Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1996c). The purpose of this paper is to examine the requirements for the rationalizability of variablepopulation choice functions in a welfarist framework.
A choice function selects, for each feasible set in its domain, a nonempty subset of the feasible set. Rationalizable choice functions perform this selection in accordance with a preference ordering on the universal set of objects of choice: the chosen set is the set of best elements in the feasible set with respect to this ordering. The rationalizability of choice functions has been analyzed extensively in the context of consumer theory, 2 but more general choice problems are investigated in the literature as well. 3 Furthermore, a growing number of contributions examine issues related to the rationalizability of various group-decision procedures (such as bargaining solutions) rather than individual choices. 4 Variable-population rational choice is investigated in Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1999b) in the context of a very simple choice problem-the pure population problem. In a pure population problem, a single resource has to be divided equally among the members of a society with population size and percapita consumption as the objects of choice. It turns out that, in this simple setting, rationalizability is relatively easy to obtain. Although being of interest in
